

7-12-12[?]

TR: Idea of roll-back persisted - greater action
without provoking GW

Vietnam became the case of constant bleed -
"don't trigger China (as in Korea).

MacArthur's crossing of 38th parallel: roll-back
under Dums

> 2 M Chinese came in.

I say

Division of Germany - and Europe - along
had the gears of GW

Both sides

This offensive strategy appeared aggressive -
it wasn't provoked or initiated as a response
to NATO intention

Note:
Mechanism: Offensive was SU response to MCN "flexibility"
response (mid-60's)

SU myth: NATO invasion (WWI, WWII,
NATO "

Each appears to confirm worst fears of other - and this response. (?)

Reality: divided states (w/ exposed GW) that can get out of
control.

Defense Strategy Study + Force Planning

StC for Cuba + Iran

No need — US invades Cuba

~~if~~ If no ^{US} invades:

to keep it pro-US, and as engine of
European recovery (US dollars)

CW: US desire to remain West Germany
but not with its own nuclear weapons
and hold on to Berlin

and to keep a US key role in
the Alliance, leadership on the Continent.

What if: no arms, after WWII?

only US arms (expected)

— no commitment to Berlin?

— Note: SU Point after 1965 (B) did not give
SU any benefits, or water in a crisis
(see Egypt ^{TR} 1973) or ~~see~~ this argument
in spheres Persia still "arms"

(Carter & ME in 1980)

Having frustrated SU vision of Officer
~~War~~, Carter Doctrine.

doublet of chance benefit action

1979 and 1980 (3? 5?) TR

TR: We want to control all oil of ME

— dec. from — we are not refused to

"loss of from" (1978) — no independent
charisma, action, young family

like VN, Iraq

7-14-12

co. J. H. H. H.

More and more as a series of "mistakes"
(wrt down future)

even with no
"descent"

When a foreseeable, moderate-prob
"event" finally occurs—

when there are some "mistakes"
(where?) is failing to forecast it,
to have warnings

to adapt "Mozzarella, affordable"
alternatives (to this a risk of catastrophe,
at a "not-exorbitant price, covering
costs, prob, other alternatives consequences

Kathrin

Fukushima

Trinit

Hiroshima

More mistakes

Ant. Central

SAC Jerry (No Bone)

the area ICBMs CMs

buildup ^{ab 4-ends} (1950-52-54)

H

unisex

ICBM

NATO / Warsaw Pact Policies

[K bluffs
Warsaw Pact
Mistake]

no wrong claims (Cicero's "Cretian")

("good for 25 years—like

Shad ...)

"Error" of not correctly mistake, buying insurance,
creating a low, continuous risk of rates.

7-15-12.

NATO/Warren Port: on both sides, the

principal aim of "containing Germany" *

- parts of keeping it divided

- keeping it quasi-occupied

(on grounds of "protection")

- preventing it from getting its own arms

- entering ^{and forming} each half in a defensive alliance

(SC ^{TR} offensive posture assumed

a NATO response that emphasized

need for "protection")

though giving each its own

arms would replace need for

this!)

[Still, was debate in FRG, in ... 1958? How conducted,

modeled? See this Fed of German Committee)

↳ permanent presence of US forces)

,"It's just a threat - WHY LIMIT?"

But wasn't det encouraged (WHY?) UNLIMITED

threat vs. certainty;

so as wasn't about "collective danger" of large
threatening attack.

[WHY planned: give A, then H-bombs?

Nyp: it wasn't substituted for A-bombs:

MISTAKE (Kelly?)
Power

* dominating its own allies

and subordinating its own MIC

Shakti + anur - mura (+ bawing) as
religion (spiritual - god-like - Krishna,
"higher than us, humans" B.C.)

like "Kocher" Holocaust!

Burnt Offering!

Human Snake: Shakti bawing

Over to Anur

Talpa - penance

TN wings

Snake - we write

He considered disintegrating Germany, unified
first convention

But VEP has considered that (withdrawal of
US troops) — because he wanted
unilateral - Repression (!) CW kind of spending.

|| Why didn't the so for GCD (instead of after
SAis) in 1956?

Estes wanted US troops in Europe, for denial
of Europe troops — needed

Estes framed a European negotiation — Pan-European
(trade with Russia) — with Europe

(London, wanted dollars to Europe; but by 1955 —
from of trading block from which US is excluded).

Who will West Europe x future by protection
from? If not us, we can't tell the what to do —
[do what?

Sell the ans? Get oil from us, not SU?

MLC

(Boeing is an largest exporter: Commis aircraft.)

TR/DE [Castro's actual, demonstrated willingness
to see the war blown up in the event
of occupation of Cuba (he expected in
the next 24-48 hours)

was (the only leader to have faced
such a prospect during the CW — until
Afghan, Iraq)

was what NATO purported to believe and
accept — and eventually did, ^{and} of all approaches —

"Are they crazy?" (yes — but no more so than
Castro (or his) or other warring leaders.

[see me in Rock Kien, facing MG:]

[see me going to confront Mao at Peking —
with guns.]

TR. Johnson's concern about "whether Korea is defense
perimeter" was, what if Rhee (is encouraged to) attack,
and war starts that way.

What
What if ^{West} Chinese intentions in East Germany —

How could Europe or West Germany or
US want SIOB in that case? USCP
only a desire for perimeter war

Also: Even this — will quickly escalate to all-out war
(if US troops are fighting here — so go first!)

Perceptions from Army: "between 1933 and 1945, the
happened, in Germany."

Between 1948

7-16-12

"The train has left the station, and
is rolling down the tracks..."

HAK(N) to Dab. Sept? Oct? 1969

WTF New U.S. (Cruiser?)

plane? train

But like RFR's ^{also} Private ult to Dab -
a bluff. This one, defied - not
commit out.

(Again SU did not have freedom
or power to influence "puppet", NVN.)

Private ults. are not ^{so} committing
(Each has influence of other...)

See TCS on trains & trucks: Hanoi

me + RF

Brian Wilson

(white train) (Oakland, VN)

Like 43 means from ship to explosion,
8:15 AM Hanoi

From Hitler point of view, even more scheduled
for early 1939.

"If his big on World War [assistance
to German expansion] they will not
survive it."

(Though expulsion was his proposed
policy until ... when? border closed,
Sept. 1, 39?

Moldavian goal until ...?

But "franco-Bolshevik murder" meant
that Final Solution began with Barbarossa —
a cover of extermination. (of Jews & Slavs: "not
and Jews": "usual
Jews")
(Vs. Mayer — larger focus on Jews
shifted to Jews with Stalinski at Moscow.)

[If he expected to conquer world — only let
Jews out of his hands for 1937-40: keep them
till war, then kill them.)

German people accepted "Communist takeover" (spies?)
= Better dead than red — "Nothing is worse than
Comm."

TR:

But ^{Hith} Nazism was unique, in combination of
~~also~~ total, at home [Stalin] and expansionism
abroad [Japan? not us. "developed nation"?]
vs. core countries, advanced armies

⊕ extermin (Stalin internally)
first as US treated "First World" occupied
countries well - to drive Hitler!

Found TW (from or more colonized areas,
cooperative with capt.) all imperial countries
were shot equally dead, inc. US (via proxy
neo-colonialism
little England
indirect empire)

TR/MR (vs. Amey)

other countries 1) Post WW(I) / original treaty
2) hyper-inflation
3) unemployment

but only Germany, ^{but} all 3 in succession;
(not occupied); vulnerable to a const. takeover by a
minority regime, which did not curtail
its expansion ^{fully} until 1939 (though my is
West sympathetic with aggression to East;
but Hitler couldn't count on that (!!))

"Why Germany?"

(Sgt. who converted Am Frank Brown with

offer with NATO

Hith; support to right-
wing groups; intel on SU.)

US ~ Germany

America - expansion

Slaves - exploitation, "total. system" (!?)

Total War - Slaves

Strat. Bombing: only one (UK) not having (except end of game)

[We were urging "unlabeled" (? UK!) to adopting strat. bombing strategy] → never

USAF; SAC (under Kelly;

and/or Power (how long?)

not a "natural" or compelling strategy to anyone else

see WW2: — NOASTAD; ARNOLD
Sakyo:

X // (What were early loyalty policies, "cluster, strategy, for

SO

(usual

UK

British

France

Pak

China

Brazil

Argentina

South Africa

Did she even feel curiously
different from Kelly/Pomeroy/Reynolds
on bombing strategy?

Referring WW2 experience?!

(Sandy?

If not, why not?)

see the on Hiroshima!

(But: Marshall!)

After WW2: We are creating colonial power in TW:

hoping to inherit all former colonies, with lack of
A-bombs.

not better or worse than
the war.

7-16-12

3.

But A-Berlin ⊕ US breaks in European permits

Epstein
(Shuttlecock?)

Number from

MB (Kermit/Hog '58
Eight '73?

Divided Europe (West near US hegemony:

MO-US Region

(US, Com. Partners in SPD)

Divided Germany

Remain West Germany, in NATO (no indep. moves)

Berlin

Acceptable to SU, US, West Germans, Europe,
West Berlin, East German regime.

(^{US-SU} discrete purposes, plus for, secretary operation
of European if this closed, i.e. West Berlin)
(after 1964, US)

Not "acceptable to East Europeans, East Germans,
East Berlin (people, at regime):

Possible uprisings in any of those;

danger of East-West conflict: Western
intervention in Eastern result (pers. joining of

East German forces), esp. West Germany in
East German & East Berlin result.

Both US & SU leaders would not to permit
that ("spill-over"): but without certainty of success.

(Even if "containment": on ECHR Plan. Suppose it had been
less mobile policy: effect of H-bomb was in Europe;
NDC Work (CIV also to end: though, Amber
bowman).

207 ~~Frankfurter~~ Contracted Phase
the = late '50, '57 intended to turn over
blankets for ICBMs - not under Soviet to
SACEUR control - Hoped resources pooled,
+ use coordinated but
(Harms?)

209. Even with Khrushchev, '59,
the supported VCS view that we should help
by allies develop a more solidly - ~~presented~~ &
200 US weapons,

210. "and USSR as enemy," Khrushchev was angry
then by allies...
Upgraded SU note of covering

282-81 late '50's, Adenauer opposed of a US-SU
treaty that would settle Berlin question on terms
that would perpetuate Khrushchev's non-member states
status, Aug 59 + Adenauer '60 opposed on principle
any special visiting status for Khrushchev - non-member
status of Bundeswehr

the not willing to press for conversion on
this from Khrushchev

SU couldn't resist initial Khrushchev

development of atomic cap - by Khrushchev

If camp was to be divided, Khrushchev was cap. could not
be persuaded just for a Berlin settlement.

284: JFK Assassination - didn't want to have
independent

Book: MRBMs of Hany again for cars built by SO.

Admission to get into NATO, for many years
1953-55 but once in, Hantebis 1957-60.

TR: Japanese BW program was kept secret after
WWII because US

New book with the claim: US did use BW
in Korean War: NC said he could no
longer believe this as Com propaganda (as he
had believed, and I too).

NC reviewed "The US & BW" secrets from the Early CW & Korean
War
Stephen H. Endicott 1998
Anchorage Press

"Factors of Death," Graham H. Harris
Japanese BW & US Cover-up
Routledge 2002 (+ updated; BAS

Harris opened in 1953-54 they wouldn't

263. Mikoyan brought up repeatedly in 1958 —
even about Khrushchev's cap.

Ackman did not deny Khrushchev's
to have used — if CB & F, and not PRG?

SU provoked

Khrushchev's first shot to organize new cap.
(Storage cap. late 1958),

"No consideration that Berlin crisis erupted just as a
New '58 threshold was to be crossed.

[of 1960, Khrushchev had warned on QRA.

[

Made it more likely that Khrushchev would
intervene in uprising in East Germany.

^{for}
282 Mikoyan - Dulles for '59

USSR wanted NATO to keep Khrushchev from
being to provoked — if violent, Khrushchev
if

— more able to intervene in event of an uprising
in the East, and the East Khrushchev might be more
likely to rise up — EU might have GDR and SW might
result

possibly he stuck

see

(~~1/11~~)

(11)

(after Chinese situation is known - about unbalanced
VCS: situation ~ 50-51 next the lot to take Chinese

a decision to leave Korea

from me

CIA: for 51 ~ 50-50 that Korea would

would lead to

Ernst Bevin: felt

Was scared by Clay, was a doozy - he
asked him to resign to get away

from leaders CPD and NSC-68 ~ 1950

both point to American

and Korean Resistance (? check?)

(Marshall Plan being out...)

[Did ^{TR} worry that West + Korea would stress
back in Korea as revenge for Korea?

But VCS was being planned - don't take
risk, for fear of

Bevin: (NATO 1949)

after Korea, Arthur Acheson + McCloy discuss
certainly present basis of US troops ¹⁹⁵⁰ - which

+ from Korea count up in East

1949 - Chinese rev, SU atomic cap. (neutralizing
US areas);

MacArthur crossing 38th; roll back in
Korea We don't ~~pressure~~

~~Adm.~~ We won't ~~pressure~~ a rep.
that may lead us to encourage an
uprising in

the ~~making~~ decision
in 1957, Possible use of arms to support an uprising
in North Korea,

US does not ~~pressure~~ press. of uprising in
East Berlin in 1953
[as in China]

[Querry Crisis: introduction of use-
restriction in Taiwan in 1958?]
[Hong-Kong 1958]

Threat of intervention & press. EU. in
Berlin / ~~Korea~~
Korea
China / Taiwan

X (How to avoid "losing China" - P. 100 - if not
of threat and use of arms? EVIDENCE?

X Berlin Crisis in 1958 and fail as Querry!
(expecting minimal Rep.)

President even talks in the Acheson 1957-59 (Structure)

p. 161-62 Sketched.

May '56 mission intel. the day to present.
counter-attack - "intel" - would not

mission intel I to [unclear] want
mission properties David to the

164-65 1954: the VCS Dec 54 - their intention to launch
SAC in case of attack of actual attack
(even when there were hoping for even
but had not yet been launched).

(1)

(165) Nov 8, 1954 -

194-95 from [unclear] VCAE

7-18-12

"It's better than the alternative"

like, Permitte* (vs. LOW, or Delegation*)
is not a different reason to justify or accept anything;

"the alternative" is meaningless; there
is now just one alternative.

(and the model, the "decision problem"
is an "fine" legend representation, question,
revision, replacement.

Consider the possibility of change — and the
urgent necessity of — of exploring, mining,
negotiating, and alternatives
within all the "available" ones are
diagnosis, survival, illegal, misadventure,
contingencies, disruption, etc....

*Difficult trigger to a D.M.

cf: McN on RT: "What's your alternative?"

(coercion; bombing, ground ("like C-II" WROCKG.)

TR
Dulles on Quincy: "GW always looks intolerable —

until you're face to face with a local defeat."

(Paraphrase)

("the alternative")

McN on blockade + surveillance, means to attack:

"Wait until you look at alternatives."

Kennan, difficult on Europe: RIGHT: Kennan on C-II.

Langes.

(Mitzun; friends? ^{Bureau} future/

- you can get anyone to do ^{almost} anything. ^(evil)
or to blind themselves, ^(as some people)
drawing their attention away from
covered...

BW² = SIOF, MM

Playing for Time

TR: "I don't seem to wonder how a person can
live - and want to be loved by - an evil
person (or, evil-alien).

He feels alone about that.

~~TR~~ (It seems ^{was} like a child - with
a mother or abusing, unloving parent.
or concealing

Now people love this rule.

(or (sentiment?) jealous

Stochastic syndrome

Partly Hermit

CULT (RAND)

It's not as if - as in Langes -
he did cruel, evil things out of love for
"us" or someone else.

Stalin, Hitler, Mao. (Humbacher-BW; Conton-El bal;

JFE CB N R

FDR - S-B. (Popper); A-bombs...

["Nobels' prize."

(Would FDR or
Nobels have

acted differently?]

Franklin D. Roosevelt: "There are millions of
small concentration camps" (Forbes! All, at one level.)

[You can't tell much about a person's
character or motives [or "intent, goodness, beliefs"]
of what they're doing or have done or are
prepared to do.

What are the pressures coming on them?
Group projects, values, beliefs, criteria of membership
& achievement? Modes, models; trends; media.
What are they led (or chosen) to believe?
To act on; priorities; various loyalties.

But you can judge the acts, the efforts:
(to some extent, regardless of all above);
& form opinions about the motives, beliefs, attitudes...
and judge acts & consequences relative to those...

[There never has been an adequate, compelling
justification for war, OR THREATENING IT
(though many are led to believe otherwise, in part
or about past or present — always wrong, or lying.
no. HK — 100M lives...

or for "one man to be able to threaten
WWII can — 60M or 40M (a WWI? 13M?)

Civil War: ideal. conflict, but Cold War (if not);
or WWI: not WWI: or Iraq, Gulf, (Afghan)... ME
or TW from colonial, Central America, ^{Caribbean} (Indonesia)

except
us.
nationalization
(West Eur; ME;
Central America)

^{state}
(if don't want to under what a New
Jersey looks like — see him in the mirror.

(not FU, FS, or LNR)

Is Rule of law possible with BW/CW exp.
of Russia & other not known?

Are laws sound, on balance, of tactics?
detention?

What are Chinese promises?

What was Human dilemma — real progress — in 1957-63?
(FAS?)

State of NY banks?

EMP?

interstate banks

Answer Cole's question 7-21-72

(NRA - Deterrence lobby)

[Effect of A-monopoly, then, including:

1. Enable us (US) to encourage us
to hold on to (status quo) (legitimacy) of
(Southern!) half of divided countries i.e. TW,
former colonial possessions, and autocratic
monarchies (legit. military) + oppressive
regimes that sound US Corp. (+CW) interests;

South Korea

Taiwan

South Vietnam

(+) Berlin and around West Germany (half)

(all ^{except West Germany} subject to uprisings

- against oppression (authoritarian)

- against foreign control/occupation

- for unification


possibly aimed at other half and/or its
Comm sponsors, SO in China

(+) keep SO out of ME (Iran, Egypt,
Iraq... ^{Jordan?} ^{Libya?} ^{Sudan?})

all of threatening FU + FS, raising risk of GW
"slightly"

TR What was the contribution of the previous
ans road to the stone (+ continuation) of
WWI?!

Can Engels. PD Smith 92



Det

even in Iran which
dead in 03 not in 0-10.

Hoax of D-L

It's not that since 1965 there's been
no perceptible difference - even, major difference -
between striking points of record.

(40 M dead vs. 140 M dead - 10 US (100 M
~ 2 M + ...))

It's that the difference (a range of
possibilities) at least does not outweigh
even a very small difference (increase)
in ¹⁾ the likelihood of GW associated with
(control of) maintaining a FS ~~cor~~ posture,
a D-L cap, with ²⁾ its disposal (loss of
proportion or false alarm or more conflict or
large non-war conflict

3) on its cost

4) on its ~~for~~ mismanagement of RU threats
(the real reason for wanting it)

5) on its alteration of a maneuver (that of US)
against proliferation and against non-proliferation
risk [MIA DET: DET-E over]

6) on its promotion of proliferation (to unstable
posture and countries)

8-1-12

my book:

Pat: nothing about the nuclear arms race
has ever been decided democratically

(first mail from PD Center 322 - Henry was
never the Target, since May 1943

(paper → Semits) (Harris & Rothblatt,
March '44)

Better showed, formal then in 1995 (50 yrs)

Semits fooled (not Court, Bush, ...)

as to Target: thought to deter Henry

(went if Hitler used it as suicide?)

Now, ex.

Henry

Data next use? No retail? One
retail? Annexed^{US} first (not use it as
suicide? ...)

Spilled out enquiries

"PD and convinced" FU against a N & WS,
(until May 8, 1945?)

Schulz on Paris
Schulz on TG

Dagberty - Lynn Edna
on Ecu cas

Calculation of the loan
on Ecu cas

[arker - with various
logit signs

(begin the fallant -

on a deal: don't

"deasy" I can't protect
against it: just not up
now?)

Quater

Duller - the ^{of} 54 MSC

like grenades

(SIOP)

TR

Quincy - with you out close,
you on the attributes

Parr - WWK

Hilly - Cohen

WHR - HR

WHR - me

2AM
8-11-12

Nitter?

Summary:

the / Dulles / Amers
(EO vault)

Belgian - Also letter
anything before C-II?

50. Egyptian strategies

- R BLUFFS (LHN?)
- French - formal letter
- ignorance of UK
- Hassan steps
- Photos of P.O. 1 bird
- I CONSIDER ESCAPING